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Measuring Market Power in U.S. Industry
ABSTRACT
Non-competitive conduct can be assessed by estimating the size of the
markup or Lerner index achieved in a market. The markup implies a price
elasticity of demand faced by the representative firm. For a given markup,
non-competitive conduct is greater the more elastic is the market elasticity
of demand. The ratio of the firm's to the market elasticity is a measure of
non-competitive conduct that is insensitive to the value of the monopoly.
To implement this measure, both the firm's and the market elasticities of
demand must be estimated. Hall shows how to estimate the markup, and hence
the elasticity faced by the firm, from the cyclical behavior of
productivity. To estimate the market elasticity, an instrumental variables
procedure exploiting a covariance restriction between productivity shocks
and demand shocks is used. Results for broad sectors of private industry





Cambridge, MA 021381. Introduction
This paper presents some new estimates of the degree of market power in
U.S. industry. Hon-competitive outcomes can be assessed by comparing price
and marginal cost. Using price-cost margins alone to assess market power is
problematic because they fail to take into account the value of the
monopoly. A monopoly will command a greater margin the more inelastic is
the demand for the good. Differences in elasticity of demand should be
taken into account in comparing conduct across markets. The measure in this
paper does so by normalizing the estimated markup by the elasticity of
demand.
In a recent series of papers, Robert Hall1 suggests that many U.S.
industries are not competitive. This result is based on a simple and
elegant reinterpretation of the well-known fact that productivity varies
pro-cyclically. The reasoning is as follows: As output expands in the
trough of a recession, labor increases less than is warranted by a standard
production function. Hence, price exceeds marginal cost. Put differently,
when output is low, price does not fall enough to allow the sale of goods
that can be produced at very low marginal cost. Hall reasons that this
finding is only consistent with a high degree of monopoly power. There is
little evidence of substantial profits in U.S. industry; he reasons that
the monopoly profits are dissipated by chronic excess capacity.
1Hall (l9BGa, b, c).-2-
In this paper, I extend Hall's framework to yield an independent
measure of the degree of monopoly power in an industry. Hall takes perfect
competition as his null hypothesis and then measures departures from pure
competition. In the formulation in this paper, the polar hypothesis of pure
monopoly can be studied. More importantly, if the industry is neither
perfectly competitive nor perfectly monopolistic, a measure of the degree of
market power can be calculated. The markup implies an elasticity of demand
faced by the representative firm in the industry. The ratio of the market
elasticity of demand to that implied by the markup is a measure of market
power. In the polar case of perfect competition, it equals zero. In the
opposite polar case of perfect monopoly, it equals one. In the intermediate
range between zero and one, it measures non-competitive conduct.
To implement this measure it is necessary to estimate both the market
elasticity of demand and the implied by the markup ratio. I follow Hall in
estimating the latter from the cyclicality of productivity. To estimate the
market elasticity of demand, I exploit the covariance restriction between
the productivity shock and the disturbance in the demand equation. By
definition, an industry productivity shock is uncorrelated with the demand
disturbance. The restriction serves to identify the price elasticity of
demand. This covariance restriction has an instrumental variables
interpretation. The productivity shock is a valid instrument for the price
variable in the demand equation. This approach to estimating the elasticity
of demand should have wide application beyond its use here in measuring
market power.-3-
2. Theoretical Framework for Measurjn Market Power
In this section of the paper, I review Hall's measure of non-
competitive behavior and develop a further measure of the degree of monopoly
power.
Under assumptions of constant returns to scale and competition Solow
(1957) shows that the total factor productivity residual (the "Solow
residual") will measure technological change in a production function. This
residual is defined as
(1) —- Ak
-a(n -k)
where Ak, and equal the percent change in output, capital, and
labor, and equals the share of labor income in nominal output. The share
is measured as —
WtN/PtYtwhere W, N, and are the levels of the
nominal wage, labor, the nominal price level, and real output. Equation (1)
applies equally well to the aggregate economy or to a narrowly defined
industry.2 Solow's derivation requires that the technology be constant
returns to scale and that technological change be disembodied. Solow's
derivation also requires that markets are competitive and labor is variable
2 . Variablesand parameters should all be thought of as subscripted by i
for industry. This subscript is suppressed except where it is needed in a
particular context. Productivity has a drift so is not mean zero.
Hence the equations in have constants that are suppressed for notational
convenience. In the estimates, a Constant is included in all the
regressions so the estimated are mean zero in the sample.-4-
within the period, so labor is paid its marginal product. Capital need not
be paid its marginal product so it can be fixed in advance.
A similar relationship holds under imperfect competition. Define X to
be marginal cost. Solow's derivation holds if price does not equal marginal
cost, but in equation (1) labor's share in output should be replaced by
labor's share in cost. Denote labor's share in cost as atc —WtNt/XtYtand
denote the true productivity shock as tc. Then the true productivity shock
is given by




Marginal cost is, however, unobservable. Hall suggests assuming that




whereAc is the measured Solow residual, where A4 is the true
productivity shock, and where p is an unknown parameter to be estimated.
Hall's strategy is then to estimate the markup ratio p and to test the
hypothesis that it equals one. For a wide range of industries he is able to
reject the null of perfect competition. The markup does not provide a
natural metric for the degree of monopoly power in an industry. For
example, a monopoly facing relatively inelastic demand will have a larger
markup than a monopoly facing more elastic demand. Moreover, it may be
desireable to rank industries according to their degree of non-competitive-5-
conduct rather than simply to categorize them as competitive or not
competitive. I consider a measure of monopoly power that takes into account
the elasticity of demand in the industry. The measure nests the special
cases of perfect competition and perfect monopoly.
The markup can be expressed in terms of the elasticity of demand faced
by the representative firm in the industry. Hence,
* p
p alp
if the representative firm acts as if it faces an elasticity of demand equal
*3 * tofi .Thevalue -1/fl is the Lamer index of market power. Denote the
market elasticity of demand as fi.If the industry is monopolized, or if its
* finscollude effectively to duplicate the monopoly outcome, then fi will
equal fi.Given estimates of both parameters, it is possible to test the
natural null hypotheses of monopoly (fifl*) as well as that of perfect
competition (fl* a •or,equivalently, p a 1).
Attention need not be confined, however, to these polar cases. The
ratio of the market to the fin's elasticities is a natural measure of
3This formula is a simplerearrangement of the first order condition
for the one-period profit maximization problem. It will also arise from a
discounted present value maximization problem as long as sales today do not
affect demand in the future.-6-
monopoly power. Define this ratio as
(4) o.fl/$
Thecoefficient has a natural interpretation.4 Under competition 6 equals
zero; under monopoly it equals one. If the industry functions as a Cournot
oligopoly, the reciprocal of 0 measures the number of equally-sized firms.
Bresnahan (1987) argues persuasively that the ratio 0 is an interesting
measure of conduct for models where Cournot behavior is not maintained. It
normalizes the departure of price from marginal cost by the elasticity of
demand. The interpretation as the reciprocal of the number of fins in a
Cournot oligopoly provides a useful metric for market outcomes even under
different models of firm behavior.
3. Identification and Estimation
The strategy is to estimate the markup ratio p and the price elasticity
of demand fiandthen to compute the index of market power 0.In this
section, I consider instrumental variables procedures for estimating these
parameters.
To estimate the markup ratio, p, Hall makes the crucial identifying
assumption that the true productivity shock A has no aggregative
4 . . . * . Thedistinction between fiandfihasbeen discussed at least since
Chamberlain. It is developed by Bresnahan (1982) and analyzed in detail by
Bresnahan (1987).-7-
component. This assumption is specifically at variance with some theories
of the business cycle. Specifically, Kydland and Prescott (1982) rely on an
aggregate productivity shock as the only driving variable in the business
cycle. (It is important to note, however, that some implementations of real
business cycle theories, notably that of Long and Plosser (1983), generate
cycles with shocks that are independent across sectors.) Hence, Hall's
formulation, as he is careful to acknowledge, can shed no light on theories
that require an aggregative productivity shock as an essential ingredient in
aggregative fluctuations.
Under Hall's assumption, aggregate GNP growth is a valid instrument for
5 -tk)in equation (1) on industry data.Some recent work of my own
callsinto question Hall's assumption in this data. In particular, for many
industries it is difficult to reject that marginal cost moves consistently
with observed productivity under the hypothesis that observed productivity
is true productivity (Shapiro, 1987). In this case, Hall's procedure is
invalid. On the other hand, in about half the non-durable manufacturing
industries- -results for which I will highlight here- -my earlier test rejects
the null that observed productivity is true productivity. Moreover, it is
common practice in industrial organization to assume that year-to-year
changes in aggregate output come from demand. Hence, it seems best to
remain agnostic; I present results based on Hall's elegant solution of using
aggregate CNP growth as an instrument in the markup equation.
5 .. - . . Usuallyidentification is not achieved by disaggregation alone. In
this case, at least approximately, disaggregation does lead to
identification because of the role of the aggregate demand shock. See the
Appendix for details.-8-
This agnosticism need not be nihilism. It there are truly exogenous
variables that are correlated with movements in labor input, these can be
used as instruments. Valid estimates can be offered without taking a stand
on whether or not there is a macroeconomic component to true productivity
growth. Oil prices and government purchases (especially military purchases)
are candidates for instruments. Estimates that use these will also be
presented.6
Although one only needs to estimate the elasticity of demand to
estimate 8, it is helpful to write down the entire demand equation.
Consider the following demand equation in percent change form for a given
industry:
(5)
Here, Ay is the growth rate of output, tp is the growth rate of the
relative price, the are demand shift variables, and is a taste shock.
To estimate the elasticity of demand, it is necessary to overcome a
difficult simultaneity problem. The often intractable identification
problem has a straightforward solution in this context. Consider the
6Hall (1987) takes the agnostic position and uses similar instrument
lists. But see Hall (1986a, b, c).-9-
following identifying assumptions:
• The productivity shock is uncorrelated with aggregate demand
or other aggregate demand shifters such as military expenditure or
oil prices.
• The productivity shock is uncorrelated with the taste shock
v and with other variables that shift demand.
The first of these assumptions has already been discussed. It is used by
Hall to identify p in equation (2). For aggregate demand to be a valid
instrument for then aggregate demand must be one of the demand
shifters Z. For an instrument to be valid it must both be uncorrelated
with the disturbance and correlated with the endogenous variable.
The second assumption follows virtually by definition of a productivity
shock. Independent movements in technology should be uncorrelated with
changes in taste. The identifying assumption is a covariance restriction
rather than the more conventional exclusion restriction. Such a covariance
restriction has an instrumental variables interpretation (Hausman and
Taylor, 1983). The estimated disturbance is a valid instrument for
price in the demand equation (5). It is certainly correlated with price
movements, it is by construction uncorrelated with the aggregate demand
component of Z, and it is, by assumption, uncorrelated with the taste
shocks Implicitis the assumption that the productivity shock is- 10
uncorrelated with the other excluded variables, which are thrown into the
error term.7
The two-step estimator where the residuals from (2) are used as
instruments for (5) is consistent asymptotic normal and is efficient (see
Hausman, Newey and Taylor (1987)). Indeed, since the demand equation is
just-identified, the instrumental variables estimator is numerically
identical to maximum likelihood. Yet, the covariance matrix printed out by
standard computer packages is incorrect. The true covariance matrix is a
function of nuisance parameters. I compute and report the correct
estimates. See the Appendix for details of the computation.
Onepossibleexcluded variable, future price changes, could defeat
identification. If goods are durable, this variable is relevant for demand
and could well be correlated with the productivity shock. The results for
the durables are suspect in any case because the flow demand curve is
completely inadequate for them. Developing a complete theory of supply and
demand for durables under imperfect competition is well beyond the scope of
this paper. The results for durables are included only for completeness.
Before presenting the estimates, further consideration of the
parameterization of the demand equation is in order. As noted above, only
the parameter of the relative price will be estimated. The omitted
variables are orthogonal to the instrument, so this procedure yields
consistent estimates. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile thinking about the
7lJnder the identifying assumptions, instrumental variables estimation
of fiisconsistent even if all the Z are omitted. Efficiency could be
gained, however, by including some it they are observable. Of course, if
they are endogenous, one would need instruments for them.- 11-
omittedvariables. In particular, aggregate demand is omitted. Note the
instrument is orthogonal to this omitted variable not just in theory but by
construction as long as aggregate GNP is used an instrument in the markup
equation. Yet, omitting this crucial demand shifter leads to an
inefficiency. One way to include it without having to estimate another
parameter is to estimate a homogenous demand system. In this case, the left
hand side of (5) becomes industry output growth minus aggregate output
growth. Hence, the demand equation becomes
(5') - — flp+Z1y
+
where and are, as before, the industry output growth, relative
price growth, and demand shock; where is aggregate output growth; and
where are demand shifters excluding aggregate output growth. All the
elements of Z1 except the constant are subsumed into the error term so only
fiandthe intercept are estimated. Note that the orthogonality of aggregate
output growth to the instruments implies that the estimate of will be
numerically the same whether (5) or (5') is estimated. The standard errors
will, however, be affected. The demand equation actually estimated is (5')
where all of the demand shifters (except the constant) are subsumed into the
disturbance.
Gross output versus value added
The data used to estimate both the markup and the demand equation will
be on a value-added rather than a gross price basis. Hence, the estimated- 12-
parametersare not comparable to conventionally estimated ones. Hall
(1986a) gives the formula to convert the value-added markup to the ratio of
gross price to marginal cost (i).If'y is the share of materials in gross
output and materials are used in fixed proportions with gross output, then
—p/(l+(p-l)-y).Hubbard (1986) and Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen
(1987) stress how Hall's empirical results on the value-added markups are
substantially larger than the gross-output markups.
The firm's and the market elasticities of demand (* and fi)alsoare
estimated on a value-added basis. Again under the assumption that materials
are used in fixed proportions with gross output, it is possible to calculate
the elasticities on a gross price/gross output basis. Specifically, the
gross price/gross output elasticities arefl— fl*/(l7)and—
Notethat the correction for both the firm's and the market elasticities are
8lJsing the value-added deflator rather than the gross output price
index in the demand function also adds a multiple of the growth in real
materials prices to the disturbance of the demand function. This component
of the disturbance is orthogonal to the productivity shock instrument.
Changes in materials prices will not bias the measure of total factor
productivity as long as materials are used in fixed proportions (the
assumption made here) or value-added is measured as a Divisia index (Bruno,
1978, Theorem 2). The CNP data are double-deflated, not Divisia indexes.
(The U.S. national income and product accounts are rebased every ten years,
not continually.) The bias in using the double-deflated data instead of a
Divisia calculation is very small even in the face of materials price
changes of the size seen in the 1970s (Bruno and Sachs, 1985, p. 58).
Finally, in the estimates where oil price changes are included as
instruments for the markup equation, the instrument in the demand equation
is orthogonal by construction to this major component of materials price
changes.- 13-
thesame. Hence the measure 9 need not be corrected for the materials
share.
Data are available for materials share is manufacturing. Results on a
gross output basis can hence be reported.
4. Data and Results
The markup equation (2) and the demand equation (5') are estimated on a
panel of all U.S. private industries. Estimates are presented for both
broad sectors and for two digit industries. The two digit industries have
the narrowest definitions provided in published National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPA) data. The data reflect the comprehensive revisions of the
NIPA that were published in December 1985 and are revised as of July 1986.
Details are provided in the Appendix. The data are available from 1947 to
1985 except for the labor data, which begin in 1948. The sample period in
thus 1949 to 1985 to allow for computing the changes. These data are at a
higher level of aggregation than is often used in studies of market power.
Consequently, the estimates will be averages of sometimes disparate markets.
The advantage of these data over accounting data is that, at least in
theory, the NIPA measures the appropriate economic concepts.
The markups equation (2) and the demand equation (5') are estimated by
the instrumental variables procedures discussed in the previous section.
The elasticity faced by the firm, and the ratio of the market to firm's
elasticity, 9, are computed from the estimated p and .Thestandard errors
of the estimated and 9 are computed using the first-order Taylor series- 14-
approximation,which is valid asymptotically. The covariance between the
estimated p and fliszero in the sample because of the covariance
restriction on the disturbances of the equation.
Basic Results
Table 1 presents results for broad sectors. The estimates are based on
pooled rather than the data for the total sector. Data for the two digit
industries are pooled under the corresponding sector. The two digit
industries are given in the Appendix. Construction, Wholesale Trade, and
Retail Trade have no two-digit sub-industries in these data. The pooling
procedure is as follows. The markup equation (2) is estimated by
instrumental variables on each sectoral panel of industries. Within the
panels, each two digit industry has a different intercept but the same slope
coefficient (p-l). The residuals from these equations are used as
instruments for price in the demand equation (5)9 Again, each demand
equation has a different intercept but a common slope coefficient. For both
equations, I report the system two stage least squares standard errors.1°
The reported Durbin-Watson statistics are the average for those of the two
9The residuals from the unrestricted estimates of equation (2) where p
variesacross industries are used as the instruments. This procedure
assures that the covariance restriction holds in the sample for each
industry.
10The standard errors thus are consistently estimated in light of the
clear heteroskedasticity across the two digit industries.- 15-
digitequations. The pooling has two advantages over estimates carried
out on the total data for each sector. First, the estimates are more
efficient. Second, it is possible to remove a fixed effect for each
industry.
The results of the pooled estimates are presented in Table 1.12 The
first three columns give the estimated markup coefficients, the standard
errors of estimates, and the Durbin-Watson statistics for Hall's markup
equation (2). The standard errors of the coefficient estimates are given in
parentheses. The markups are essentially zero in agriculture, construction,
and services. In durable and non-durable manufacturing and in finance, the
markups are moderately sized but strongly significant. In mining,
transportation, communications and utilities, and trade, the markups are
very large. All the markups are estimates with a moderate to very fine
degree of precision.
The next three columns give the estimates for the demand equation. The
results of the instrumental variables estimation is highly satisfactory.
Except for mining, all the estimated elasticities are negative. Except for
mining and finance, the elasticities are precisely estimated to be values
bounded away from zero.
11
The distribution across industries of the Durbin-Watson statistics
for non-durables are given in the next table. The distribution of the
statistics across the industries is consistent with the hypothesis of no
serial correlation. Results for other sectors are similar.
12For completeness, Table 1reports results for durable goods. These
should be discounted because, as noted above, the form of the demand
function is inappropriate for them.- 16-
Thenext twocolumnsgive the values of the implied elasticity
fl*— p/(l-p)and of the measure of market power 9 — Thereis a one-
to-one relationship between p and fl.Industrieswith high markups have low
implied elasticities. The measure of market power U gives a somewhat
different ranking of the competitive than do the markups alone. Mining and
finance have estimated market elasticities that are essentially zero.
Consequently, they appear to be competitive based on the 9 measure
regardless of the markup. Industries with non-degenerate estimates of the
markup also display interesting differences in ranking. For example,
transportation and retail trade have similar estimated markups. The
industries face different elasticities of demand and hence can be ranked in
terms of degree of market power.
The assumption that the slope coefficients in each of the sub-
industries are equal underlies the pooling of equations (2) and (5'). For
all industries except for durables, one cannot reject these hypotheses using
conventionally-sized tests.
Estimates for the individual non-durable manufacturing industries are
presented in Table 2. The estimation procedure is the same as for the
results in Table 1 except there is no pooling. In several of the industries
(food, textiles, apparel, and printing and publishing), the estimated
markups are insignificantly different from zero. These industries also have
small markups. Other markups are significantly different from zero. Rubber
and leather have relatively small markups; paper, chemicals, and petroleum
have intermediate markups; tobacco has a very large markup.- 17-
Theestimated market elasticities all lie between -1.0 and -1.8. Most
are estimated very precisely. Using the innovation in industries
productivity as an instrumental variable is a promising approach for
estimating elasticities of demand.
*
Thelast two columns of Table 2 give the implied estimates of $and9.
The estimates of 9 display interesting dispersion and yield rankings as to
market power that are different from those implies by the markup alone. As
in Table 1, all of the point estimates of 9 fall within the admissible range
between zero and one. Tobacco, paper, and chemicals all have values of 0
insignificantly different from the monopoly outcome and at least three
standard deviations different from the competitive outcome. All three
industries can be characterized as monopolized despite their very different
estimated markups. Apparel and leather have values of 9 of 0.3 and 0.5
respectively. Moreover, each estimate has standard error such that both the
competitive and monopolized outcomes can be rejected. Food and textiles
have small estimated 9. These industries appear to be competitive, although
the point estimates are imprecise. Finally, the standard errors for
printing and publishing, petroleum, and rubber are large enough to make it
difficult to reject any hypothesis.
Alternative Instruments
The previous results are based on the perhaps incorrect assumption that
year to year changes in aggregate output are unrelated to productivity
shocks. To provide estimates that are robust to failure of this assumption,
I present estimates based on alternative instruments. These instruments- 18-
shouldbe strictly exogenous. The instruments used are growth in oil prices
and military employment.13 Oil prices have been determined largely by
forces independent of the 13.5. business cycle. These include the Suez
crisis, the OPEC price increases after the Yom Kippur war and after the fall
of the Shah of Iran, import quotas, and domestic price regulations. Changes
in military employment are largely determined by wars, which again are not
caused by U.S. business cycles. On the other hand, oil price changes and
wars effect the business cycle. Therefore, they are likely to be adequate
instruments.
The results for the pooled manufacturing data with the alternative
instrument lists are presented in Table 3. The first line repeats the
results from Table 1 for ease of reference. The next three lines show the
results for the combinations of the alternative instruments. The final line
shows the result with all three instruments. With either oil price or
military employment growth alone or jointly as instruments, 9 is estimated
to be 0.1 or 0.2. With any of these combinations of instruments, the
estimates of p and hence of 9 are very imprecise. By comparing the
estimates of the last two lines, it is potentially possible to judge whether
the use of aggregate GNP growth as an instrument is a valid over-identifying
restriction.14 The point estimates of marketpower with the alternative
instruments are smaller than with aggregate CNP growth as an instrument.
13See the Appendix for sources of these data.
formal Hausman specification test computed on the last two
estimates of the markup and demand equations in Table 3 does not reject the
overidentifying restriction.- 19-
Yet,those estimates are so imprecise that it is impossible to reject the




Alternative Estimates of the Markup
It is interesting to compare these estimates of market power with those
obtained by other techniques. The markup can be estimated from a cost
function rather than from the cyclicality of productivity. Appelbaum
(1982), for example, estimates 9 using the markup from the derivative of an
estimated, parametric cost function. He examines three non-durable
manufacturing industries: textiles, rubber, and tobacco. His findings for
textiles and tobacco agree qualitatively with mine. Textiles are
essentially competitive and tobacco has strong market power. He finds
rubber is essentially competitive whereas I find that industry to be close
to the monopoly outcome, albeit with an imprecise point estimate)6
Appelbaum estimates less monopoly power than do I because he finds
smaller markups. It is fairly straightforward to explain why Appelbaum's
implementation of the cost function yields systematically lower markups than
does Hall's non-parametric approach that I follow in this paper. Appelbaum
uses a constant returns to cost function where labor, materials, and capital
15The underlying estimates for most of the individual industriesusing
only oil and military employment growth have large standard errors.
16Note that rubber isa very concentrated industry (see below).- 20-
areall free to vary within the period. Thus, he constrains marginal cost
to equal average cost. If an industry shows little profit in excess of the
required rate of return on capital, as do most industries, this approach
will yield a small markup.17 Hall's procedure admits the possibility of
higher markups in such industries because Solow's formulation allows
marginal cost to be below average cost. In the Solow calculation, capital
can be quasi-fixed (as it surely is), so the marginal cost curve can have
upward slope.
Measures of Market Power Compared
It is useful to compare the measures of market power presented in this
paper with other measures. Before doing so, it is necessary to putthe
*
measureson an equal basis. As discussed above, p, fi, andare on a
value-added basis. Table 4 presents the estimates from Table 2 converted to
a gross output basis)8 As Hubbard (1986) and Domowitz, Hubbard, and
Petersen (1987) stress, the gross output based markup is substantially lower
than the value-added based ones. Moreover, the ranking of the markups
changes depending on the materials intensity of the industries.
17U.S. manufacturing industrj.es have low price-cost margins. Domowitz,
Hubbard, and Petersen (1986, Table 1) find that profits per output is only
about 35 percent in the most concentrated industries and 26 percent overall.
Since their calculation of profit includes normal return to capital, their
figures imply lower markups than those included in this paper. Any
calculation that is based on average cost must similarly yield low markups.
18Thegross output elasticities should be interpreted with caution
because the share of materials may have shift over time.- 21-
TableS compares a number of measures for the non-durable manufacturing
industries. They are the markup coefficient as estimated in Table 2 (p);
the markup adjusted to a gross output basis (i);theimplied elasticity of
demand from Table 2 (8*); the implied elasticity on a gross output basis
(fl*);theindex of market power from Table 2 (9); and a measure of average
concentration (CR4)J9 The cross-sectional standard deviation and simple
and rank correlations of these measures are given in Table 5. The simple
correlations among all the variables are quite high. Particularly striking
is the fairly strong correlation of the concentration ratio with the other
measures. Concentration ratios might be very misleading as to market power
in cases where the other measures may not. This is especially true if
market power arises because of monopolization of local markets. The rank
correlations of the measures with concentration are substantially weaker.
Much of the leverage for the correlations comes from the extreme observation
of tobacco. Excluding tobacco, the correlation of j and the concentration
measure falls to 0.40 and that of 9 and the concentration measure falls to
0.49. Figures 1 and 2 give a scatter of the observations for Jand9 versus
concentration. The important correlation between the measures clearly
emerges from the Figures. Aside from petroleum, the scatter diagrams are
qualitatively quite similar. The estimates of market power in this paper
give a similar picture of the degree of monopolization of U.S. non-durable
manufacturing industries than do the concentration ratios.
19The measure is the sales ratioaverage of four firm concentration
ratios based on the four digit data in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986).- 22-
Conclusion
In this paper, I discuss estimation of demand elasticities by
exploiting the restriction that demand shocks and technological shocks are
independent. Although this technique may have broad implications, it is
used here to compare market demand elasticities with those implied by price-
marginal cost margins. The price-marginal cost ratio is not, per se, a
measure of monopoly power. If an industry has a price-marginal cost ratio
that differs significantly from unity, one can reject the hypothesis of pure
competition, but one can say nothing else about the degree of monopolization
in the industry. A given price-marginal cost ratio will imply more monopoly
power the more elastic is demand. Monopoly power must be strong in order to
extract high prices in an industry with elastic demand.
The estimated measures of market power correspond to a wide range of
conduct. The point estimate for tobacco and chemicals is that they achieve
the monopoly outcome. Paper is also close to the monopoly outcome. On the
other hand, for apparel and leather, both the monopoly and competitive
outcomes can be decisively rejected.
Finally, this paper shows how to estimate the price elasticity of
demand by exploiting the covariance restriction between productivity shocks
and demand shocks. This covariance restriction is an important step in
overcoming the difficulty in identifying the demand curve because of the
lack of valid instruments. This technique for estimating the elasticity of




The data used in this paper are described in this Appendix.
Except for the data on the capital stock, they are from the National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). The data are annual and are available
at the two digit level of disaggregation. The NIPA were rebenchmarked in
December 1985. At the same time, the base year for the constant dollar
calculations was changed to 1982. The data incorporate the July 1986
revisions and were extracted from BEA computer tapes. The industry
definitions are based on the 1972 standard industrial classification.
In detail, the NIPA data are as follows. Table number refer to those in the
NIPA as published in the July Survey of Current Business.
outnut (ye): Real value-added in 1982 dollars (Table 6.2).
deflator (pr): Value-added deflator (Tables 6.1, 6.2). In the demand
equation estimates, the relative price is calculated as the ratio of the
industry value-added deflator to the aggregate CNP deflator.
manhours (nt): Hours of full-time and part-time employees (Table
6.11). The industry level manhours data are only available at the sectoral
level. To construct hours for the two digit industries, the hours for the
sectoral total are divided among the appropriate two digit industries in
proportion to the two digit industry's share in full-time equivalent
employment (Table 6.7) in the sector.
comDensation: Compensation (Table 6.4) is used in the calculation of
the labor's share, a. It includes wages and salaries, employers'
contributions to social insurance, and other labor income, but not- 24-
proprietors'income. The share is calculated as a Divisia index, that
is, it is a moving average of the share at time t and time t-l.
The capital stock data are also based on the rebenchmarked NIPA data.
They are published in the Survey of Current Business (August 1986, for
example) were obtained for this study from computer tape. The capital stock
is constant dollar net capital stock of equipment plus structures.
The data for the instruments is as follows: aggregate GNP is from the
NIPA Table 6.2 and is measured in constant 1982 dollars. Oil prices are
measured as the ratio of the producer price index for crude oil (PPI561) to
the CNP deflator. Military employment is full time equivalent Federal
military employment (NIPA Table 6.6). All instruments are annual and log
differenced.
The two digit industries pooled in the estimates in Table 1 for the
respective sectors are as follows. The number of two digit industries is
given in parentheses.
Agriculture (2): Farms; Agricultural services, forestry, and
fisheries. Mining (4): Metal mining; Coal mining; Oil and gas
extraction; Non-metallic minerals, except fuels. Construction (1).
Durable manufacturing (11): Lumber and wood products; Furniture and
fixtures; Stone, clay, and glass; Primary metal industries; Fabricated
metal products; Machinery, except electrical; Electric and electronic
equipment; Motor vehicles and equipment; Other transportation
equipment; Instruments and related products; Miscellaneous
manufacturing industries. Non-durable manufacturing (10): Food and
kindred products; Tobacco manufactures; Textile mill products; Apparel- 25-
andother textile products; Paper and allied products; Petroleum and
coal products; Rubber and miscellaneous plastic products; Leather and
leather products. Transportation (7): Railroad transportation; Local
and interurban passenger transit; Trucking and warehousing; Water
transportation; Transportation by air; Pipelines, except natural gas;
Transportation services. Communications and Utilities (3): Telephone
and telegraph; Radio and television broadcasting; Electric, gas, and
sanitary services. Wholesale trade (1). Retail trade (1). Finance.
insurance, and real estate (6): Banking; Credit agencies other than
banks; Security and commodity brokers, and services; Insurance
carriers; Insurance agents and brokers, and services; Real estate.
Services (10): Hotels and other lodging places; Personal services;
Business services; Auto repair, services, and garages; Miscellaneous
repair services; Motion pictures; Amusement and recreation services;
Health services; Legal services; Educational Services
2.Econometric Issues
Disaggregation and Identification
Aggregate output growth will not in general be a valid instrument for
estimating the markup equation (2) on disaggregate data. Disaggregation
alone typically does not yield identification. If there is an important
aggregate demand shock, equation (2) will be approximately identified. Say
aggregate GNP growth (denoted evolves as
*
— +- 26-
whereAv is an aggregate demand shock and is the share of industry i in
the aggregate. (The shares are constant only for notational convenience.)
The inconsistency in estimating p1 that arises because the aggregate is the
some of the industries is
(Al) plim T(;i -
—Var(A4)/ Aq)
The usual problem with identification by disaggregation is that as Var(tsv)
vanishes, the inconsistency is of order one. On the other hand, if the
variance of the demand shock is not small, the inconsistency is on the order
of w., which is small.
1
Instrumental Variables Estimator and Covariance Restrictions
Consider estimation of two equations analogous to the markup equation




where k —1,2indexes equations, where i —1,14indexes industries, and where
t —l,Tindexes time. In matrix notation we have
kkk k
(A3) y —X8 +v- 27
where the and ,k are stacked vectors of observations and disturbances and
—diag(X).First consider identification of the parameters, Suppose
that the first equation (k—i) is at least just-identified as is the case of
markup equation. It can be estimated by standard instrumental variables
techniques. Suppose that the second equation has two right hand side
variables. (In the demand equation they the Constant and the price term.)
The equation is under-identified by conventional means. That is, no
instrument is available. Suppose that the disturbances of the two equations
are independent industry-by-industry. That is, E(vv) —0.This
restriction is sufficient to just-identify the parameters of the second
equation. Moreover, it has an instrumental variables interpretation. The
residual from the first equation can be used as an instrument for the second
equation. This procedure yields consistent, asymptotic normal estimates
and, because the second equation is just identified, is equivalent to
maximum likelihood (see Hausman, Newey, and Taylor (1987)).
The covariance matrix printed by the computer for the second equation
will not be correct. The correct one depends on the estimated parameters
and the data from the first equation because the fitted value rather than
the true value of v1 is used as the instrument. Let Z1 be the instruments
for the second equation for the jth equation and where Z —diag(Z).(In
this paper, Z has two columns, the constant and the residuals from the
first equation.) The instrumental variables estimator of is such that
(A4) 2 2)1 ,2 ii ivi.- 28-
Notethat the second term of the right hand side of (A4) will have an
A
element involving the correlation of v and X & because Z is dependent on
the estimated value of 6. This term will add to the covariance of the
estimate 2• Define a matrix ( that has elements
(AS) —
This term is the covariance between the residual from the second equation
A
and X 6 .LetE be the MxM covariance matrix of the disturbances of the
second equations (industry-by-industry). That is, E(v2v2) —I.Let
[0 o
I.° 1
be a matrix that selects elements of Z corresponding to the fitted
instrument. The correct variance-covariance matrix of the system
instrumental variables estimator of 2 is then
A2 21 2 1 2 1 2 1
(A6) V(& )— (Z'X)Z'(DI)Z(XZ)+(Z'xY Z'(cS)Z(X 'Z)
The first term is the standard system instrumental variables covariance
matrix. The second is the correction term. The resulting standard errors
are strictly greater than the ones printed by the standard computer program.
In this application, the correction adds ten to twenty percent to the
standard errors.- 29
Table1
Elasticities Implied and Estimated
Pooled, Sectoral Estimates
Markup Equation Demand Equation Implied
*
see dw see dw 0
Agriculture 0.0 6.4 1.7 -1.814.3 2.3 -96.3 0.0
(0.4) (1.0) (3294.2) (0.6)
Mining 0.99.31.40.19.62.0-2.1
(0.3) (0.1) (0.4)
Construction 0.2 3.9 0.7 -1.0 2.9 1.5-5.2 0.2
(0.2) (0.2) (3.2) (0.1)
Durable 0.45.12.2-1.427.51.7-3.50.4
Manufacturing (0.0) (0.2) (0.3) (0.1)
Non-durable 0.4 5.0 1.9 -1.3 6.9 1.9-3.4 0.4
Manufacturing (0.1) (0.1) (0.6) (0.1)
Transportation 1.111.4 1.7 -1.0 6.4 1.8-1.9 0.5
(0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Communications 1.324.2 1.5-1.2 178.9 1.8-1.8 0.7
and Utilities (0.7) (0.4) (0.4) (0.3)
Wholesale Trade 1.7 3.4 1.6 -1.5 3.0 1.7-1.6 0.9
(0.6) (0.5) (0.2) (0.3)
Retail Trade 1.2 2.3 2.4 -1.2 2.5 1.8 -1.8 0.7
(0.4) (0.3) (0.3) (0.2)
Finance 0.2 5.5 1.1 -0.126.4 1.7 -5.5 0.0
(0.2) (0.1) (3.1) (0.0)
Services 0.0 6.6 1.5 -1.222.1 1.8 -26.4 0.0
(0.1) (0.3) (57.9) (0.1)- 30
Table 2
Elasticities Implied and Estimated
Non-durable Manufacturing Industries
Markup Equation Demand Equation Implied
*
p-i see dv see dv fi B
Food 0.43.32.3-1.04.52.2-3.80.3
(0.7) (0.3) (5.2) (0.4)
Tobacco 4.06.31.3-1.38.21.8-1.31.0
(1.8) (0.3) (0.1) (0.3)
Textiles 0.3 6.0 1.7 -1.5 8.6 2.0 -4.7 0.3
(0.3) (0.5) (4.0) (0.3)
Apparel 0.32.81.9-1.13.01.4-4.10.3
(0.2) (0.3) (1.5) (0.1)
Paper 1.55.51.7-1.55.52.4-1.70.9
(0.4) (0.3) (0.2) (0.2)
Printingand 0.4 2.9 1.7-1.8 3.7 1.6 -3.2 0.5
Publishing (0.5) (0.6) (2.7) (0.5)
Chemicals 2.0 6.2 1.8-1.5 5.3 1.8 -1.5 1.0
(0.7) (0.4) (0.2) (0.3)
Petroleum 1.3 5.9 1.4-1.514.6 2.1 -1.7 0.9
(0.7) (1.0) (0.4) (0.6)
Rubber 0.75.22.6-1.88.71.8-2.30.8
(0.2) (1.2) (0.3) (0.5)
Leather 0.85.92.4-1.26.72.1-2.30.5
(0.4) (0.5) (0.6) (0.2)- 31
Table 3
Elasticities Implied and Estimated
Pooled Non-durable Manufacturing Industries
Alternative Instruments for Markup Equation
Instruments Markup Equation Demand Equation Implied
*
growthin: p-i see dw see dw fi 0
GNP 0.4 5.0 1.9 -1.3 6.9 1.9 -3.4 0.4
(0.1) (0.1) (0.6) (0.1)
oilprices 0.114.4 1.8-1.2 6.7 1.8-8.6 0.1
(0.3) (0.2) (17.3) (0.3)
military employment 0.297.3 1.7-1.222.5 1.9-5.9 0.2
(0.3) (0.2) (7.1) (0.2)
oil prices and 0.2 6.0 1.9 -1.210.6 1.9 -7.6 0.2
military employment (0.3) (0.2) (11.3) (0.2)
GNP, oil prices, and0.3 4.9 1.9 -1.3 7.4 1.9 -3.9 0.3
military employment (0.1) (0.1) (0.9) (0.1)- 32
Table 4
Value-Added and Cross Output Parameter Estimates
value added gross output
* - p-i fi p-1 fi -y
Food 0.4 -3.8 -1.0 0.2 -7.1 -2.00.466
Tobacco 4.0 -1.3 -1.3 0.5 -2.9 -2.9 0.566
Textiles 0.3 -4.7 -1.5 0.1 -11.2 -3.6 0.582
Apparel 0.3 -4.1 -1.1 0.1 -8.4 -2.3 0.510
Paper 1.5 -1.7 -1.5 0.4 -3.5 -3.1 0.522
Printing 0.4 -3.2 -1.8 0.3 -4.7 -2.6 0.314
Chemicals 2.0 -1.5 -1.5 0.6 -2.8 -2.8 0.455
Petroleum 1.3 -1.7 -1.5 0.2 -5.3 -4.6 0.671
Rubber 0.7 -2.3 -1.8 0.3 -4.4 -3.4 0.462
Leather 0.8 -2.3 -1.2 0.3 -4.8 -2.5 0.519
* Note:The estimated p, fi, andfiarefrom Table 2. The gross output based
estimates are derived according to the formulas ji— p/(l+(p-l))(Hall, 1986a),
_** fi — fi /(l-),and ft— fl/(1-).The materials shares (y) are from Hubbard
(1986).- 33
Table 5









p 1.00 0.83 0.76 0.65 0.80 0.68
1.00 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.59
* 1.00 0.92 0.94 0.51
*







p 1.00 0.77 1.00 0.77 0.86 0.17
1.00 0.77 1.00 0.77 0.17
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